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Abstract 
 
In the Netherlands green gas is seen as a sustainable alternative to natural gas. However, green gas is still not competitive to 
natural gas in terms of pricing, and production volumes are remarkably low. Currently, there is a lot of attention to green gas 
which stems from upgraded biogas, which is produced by manure-based anaerobic co-digestion by livestock farmers. In this 
article the central question is to understand green gas demonstration projects from stakeholders’ perspectives, and identify 
barriers accordingly. The results of our analysis show that a disproportionate burden lies with biogas producers, who are 
therefore unwilling to invest. In large part this is due to juridical-administrative stipulations that provide gas grid operators with 
little incentives to invest, notably in biogas infrastructure and biogas treatment equipment. However, biogas producers face many 
more risks and challenges: (production) subsidies not being granted, legal permits to operate biogas plants not being granted, 
limitative environmental policies that restrict business operations, and price instability regarding co-feedstock. Moreover, access 
to bank to loans has declined strongly in recent years. Altogether, the risks potential biogas producers face, the lack of regulatory 
incentives grid operators have to engage in green gas business development, and the lack of market demand among end-
consumers,  do not favor green gas niche development. This can only change when policy makers design stakeholder specific 
strategies to solve those barriers; e.g. public investments funds to cover for high upfront costs, and regulatory changes regarding 
the role and competences of grid operators. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Economies are bound to change. The 
finiteness of natural resources, overexploitation of 
soils, dependency on fossil fuels, and climate change 
demand a rapid, innovative, and sustainable approach 
to foster the interests of current and future 
generations. Renewable energy sources play a central 
role in providing energy services in a sustainable 
manner and, in particular, in mitigating climate 
change (IPCC, 2011). On a global basis it is 
estimated that renewable energy accounts for 12.9% 
of the total 492 EJ of primary energy supply in 2008 
(IEA, 2010). The largest contributor is biomass 
(10.2%). Under most conditions, increasing the share 
of renewable energy in the energy mix will require 
policies to stimulate changes in the energy system. 
Government policy, the declining costs of many 
renewable energy technologies, changes in prices of 
fossil fuels and other factors have supported the 
continuing increase in the use of renewable energy. 
While renewable energy is still relatively small, its 
growth has accelerated in recent years (IPCC, 2011). 
In Europe, biomass conversion is considered a 
renewable, environmentally-sound way to produce 
energy. The EU strives to achieve a 20% share in the 
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total energy mix by 2020. Next to lowering 
greenhouse gas emissions renewable energy is also 
perceived as a way to use natural resources in a more 
sustainable way (Fischer et al., 2012).  
Although there is much discussion in the 
Netherlands about energy transitions, implementation 
of renewable energy is low compared to other 
European countries (Verbong and Geels, 2007). In 
the Netherlands, biomass is the main source for 
renewable energy generation (over three-quarters of 
renewable energy sources; Raven, 2005). The 
Netherlands aspires to achieve a 14% share of energy 
derived from renewable energy sources by 2020. To 
do this, the Dutch central government has put great 
emphasis on bio-energy, especially anaerobic co-
digestion, which it considers to be a mature 
conversion technology (Agentschap NL, 2011a). The 
anaerobic co-digestion energy output – biogas, a 
mixture of methane (50 to 70%) and CO2 - can be 
utilized for different purposes, including upgrading to 
a higher methane content (89%), which can be 
injected into the natural gas grid and can also be used 
directly in vehicles (Petersson and Wellinger, 2009). 
In the Netherlands this is also known as ‘green gas’.  
Biogas production from manure anaerobic co-
digestion (from now on to be referred to as: co-
digestion) has received a great deal of attention in 
academic literature (Geels and Raven, 2006, 2007; 
Markard et al., 2009; Negro et al., 2007; Negro and 
Hekkert, 2008; Raven, 2004, 2005, 2007; Raven and 
Geels, 2010; Raven and Gregersen, 2010; Verbong et 
al., 2001). Although agricultural biogas production 
capacity has increased tenfold during the 2000-2012 
period (Rabobank Food & Agri, 2013), “niche 
development in the Netherlands has shown clear ups 
and downs, in a non-linear pattern” (Geels and 
Raven, 2006), and is generally considered to have 
had little success (Geels and Raven, 2006; Hofman, 
2005; Negro et al., 2007; Negro and Hekkert, 2008; 
Raven, 2004, 2005). Geels and Raven (2006) explain 
non-linear development through the interaction of 
learning processes, network building and articulation 
of expectations. Niche development of biogas 
production from co-digestion is considered more 
successful in other countries, in particular Germany, 
Denmark and Austria (Geels and Raven, 2007; 
Markard et al., 2009; Negro and Hekkert, 2008). 
Although developments for biogas production 
from co-digestion in The Netherlands have been not 
been successful thus far, there are great expectations 
in relation to utilization of ‘green gas’. It has even 
found favor with the major players in the energy 
industry, especially central government, the energy 
companies and regional gas grid operators, because it 
can be utilized as a substitute for natural gas and fed 
into the natural gas grid, which is the key energy 
infrastructure in the Netherlands. Green gas is 
therefore not restricted to local use only. In theory it 
can be used throughout the country at any given time. 
Alternatively, it can be used as fuel for sustainable 
mobility, either as green gas for gas-fired vehicles, or 
as Bio-LNG for special, large industrial vehicles.  
Because more than half of the energy used in 
The Netherlands comes from natural gas, substitution 
with ‘green gas’ offers great future potential for 
greening the domestic energy market. Expectations 
are that green gas will become an effective means to 
increase the share of renewable energy in the 
domestic energy mix (Gasterra, 2008; Stichting 
Groen Gas Nederland, 2011). Moreover, green gas is 
viewed as the key energy carrier in the transition 
towards a ‘green’ energy economy by 2050, when the 
Netherlands aspires to lower its CO2 emissions by 
90% below the 1990 level. Based on the potential of 
biomass available for biogas production, especially a 
surplus of animal manure, the expectation is that 
green gas could produce up to 30 PJ per annum in the 
Netherlands. Gas grid operators expect that up to half 
of the Dutch gas mixture will be ‘green gas’ by 2050. 
This goal has been set as a ‘speculative target’ by a 
Green Gas taskforce in 2007 (Platform Nieuw Gas, 
2007), and was later adopted by the Dutch energy 
grid operators association ‘Netbeheer Nederland’, 
assuming that next to co-digestion, biomass 
gasification would account for a substantial growth in 
green gas production (Netbeheer Nederland, 2011). 
The short term goal set in 2007 was initially attaining 
8-12% green gas in the total gas mix by 2020 
(Platform Nieuw Gas, 2007), but was later adjusted 
(in 2012) to 4% (ECN, 2012). Achieving this target 
fits in with the Ministry of Economic Affairs’ 
broader goals of realizing a European ‘Gas 
Roundabout’, within the Netherlands, thanks to its 
gas reserves and geographical location, acting as a 
central node in the international natural gas market 
(as a ‘hub’ between the Anglo-Saxon countries, 
continental Europe and the Nordic countries). 
Furthermore, gas suppliers and gas grid operators 
advocate green gas as an argument to extend the 
productive lifetime of the well-developed natural gas 
infrastructure of the Netherlands. The strong 
arguments offered by these key stakeholders in the 
energy sector have helped convince the Dutch central 
government to allocate €1 Billion (SDE+ subsidy 
scheme) in support of green gas demonstration 
projects in 2011; out of a total of €1.5 Billion for 
multiple renewable energy technology routes (Min. 
EL&I, 2011a). 
All these expectations assume that after initial 
government support (i.e. the SDE+ subsidy scheme), 
large-scale green gas production will become 
competitive and go into commercial operation - that 
is, without future government support. Currently, 
however, this expectation is very far indeed from 
being met (Sanders and Hoppe, 2013). Although 
green gas is considered technologically advanced, or 
even ‘mature’ (Agentschap, 2011a), it is still not 
competitive with natural gas. Although green gas 
supply volumes are increasing, the supply - 22 
Million Nm3 per annum (for 2011) – represents only 
a small fraction of the overall domestic gas market. 
Together with (other forms of) biogas, it replaces 300 
Million Nm3 natural gas per annum, which is 
approximately 0.6% of total domestic gas use (ECN, 
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2012). These numbers illustrate the infant state of 
green gas development in the Netherlands. There are 
a number of reasons why market development is 
currently rather poor. More generally, green gas 
production and utilization require economies of scale 
(for green gas produced from landfill gas this is 
hardly a problem, but for green gas produced from 
farm-scaled co-digestion it is). For that reason, 
multiple stakeholders in the green gas production 
chain have to cooperate, notably biogas producers, 
regional gas grid operators, energy companies, 
potential end-users, and local governments.  
In this paper we focus on green gas from 
upgraded biogas, which is produced in farm-scale co-
digestion plants. Demonstration projects of this bio-
energy conversion method are currently in 
preparation. It is in these regional demonstration 
projects that efforts are made to achieve economies 
of scale by developing a green gas value chain. Here 
we focus in particular on the ‘BioNOF’ case 
(abbreviation for the Biogas Grid ‘Noordoost 
Fryslân’). In this demonstration project, which is still 
under development, a 32 km biogas pipeline is 
planned to connect distributed biogas production 
(from twelve or more biogas producers) to a central 
location, where the biogas will be upgraded to green 
gas and then injected into the natural gas grid. The 
ambition is to produce biogas at the rate of 10,000 
Nm3 per hour (E-Kwadraat, 2011). In this project the 
biogas producers are dairy farmers, who use the 
manure surplus from their cows as the main 
feedstock (besides co-products for substrate) for co-
digestion.  
This case study is academically positioned in 
the debate surrounding biogas niche development 
(Geels and Raven, 2006, 2007; Markard et al., 2009; 
Negro et al., 2007; Negro and Hekkert, 2008 Raven, 
2004, 2005, 2007; Raven and Geels, 2010; Raven 
and Gregersen, 2010; Verbong et al., 2001). 
However, in contrast to this body of literature the 
focus in this paper not solely socio-technical, and 
hence, does not follow the multilevel perspective or 
strategic niche management system analytical 
perspective to study niche development at system 
level. Following Geels’ comment on raising more 
attention on agency in niche development processes 
(see Geels, 2011) we rather focus on stakeholder 
characteristics, interactions and ‘games’ at the local 
(project) level.  
The paper aims to contribute to a further 
understanding of demonstration projects in which 
green gas is produced from co-digestion. We focus 
here on the stakeholders’ perspectives, and try to 
identify the barriers they may experience. In such a 
multiple stakeholder environment it is particularly 
important to safeguard the public interest. We apply 
stakeholder analysis to generate knowledge about the 
actors in green gas demonstration projects – “so as to 
understand their behaviors, intentions, inter-relations 
and interests; and for assessing the influence and 
resources they bring to bear on decision-making or 
the implementation process” (Varvasovszky and 
Brugha, 2000). This approach methodologically fits 
the ‘backward mapping’ approach (Elmore, 1979) 
and other types of ‘bottom-up’ research, which is 
commonly used by policymakers and their advisers. 
In policy studies stakeholder analysis is often used as 
a heuristic tool to analyse and structure multi-actor 
societal and policy issues (e.g., Dunn, 2008), 
especially when one is confronted with so-called 
‘wicked problems’ (Rittel and Weber, 1973) or 
‘poorly structured policy problems’ (Hoppe, 2010), 
in which complexity and stakeholder 
interdependency are high, and the goals and means 
for achieving policy targets are diffuse, or even 
controversial. In this article, we take a critical policy 
perspective stance.  
The article is structured as follows. Section 2 
presents the research methodology. Section 3 
provides a literature review of green gas niche 
development. In this section we also conceptualize 
the green gas value chain, and define ‘green gas 
demonstration projects’. In section 4 we present the 
results of our stakeholder analysis. We identify the 
key stakeholders and address their roles, positions in 
the green gas value chain, perceptions, and main 
problems. In the final section we draw conclusions 
from our analysis and provide advice to policymakers 
to develop strategies on how to overcome the barriers 
identified. 
 
2. Methods 
 
A stakeholder analysis was applied to 
agricultural green gas demonstration projects, 
notably the ’BioNOF’ case in the Netherlands. The 
reason for selecting this case was that it presented the 
most prominent green gas demonstration project in 
the Netherlands at the time when data collection for 
this study was planned (2011-2012). In order to find 
out whether problems experienced in the ‘BioNOF’ 
case resemble typical problems occurring in other 
agricultural biogas co-digestion demonstration 
projects, data were also collected from other projects 
in the Netherlands, such as ‘Heeten’, ‘De Marke’, 
and more recently ‘Noord-Deurningen’. Albeit its 
unique case study character we do not consider 
‘BioNOF’ a standalone case in terms of stakeholders’ 
views, interests, positions, inter-stakeholder resource 
exchange, and experiences.  
Our analysis is based on 39 interviews with 
green gas experts in the Netherlands. The majority of 
the interviews were conducted face-to-face, and some 
interviewees were contacted more than once. 
Interviews were conducted with persons representing 
different stakeholders in the green gas production 
chain system, including energy producers (8; 
farmers),  energy companies (6), grid operators (6), 
municipalities (5), consultants (2), provincial 
government (3), ngo’s (3), potential end-users (1), 
national government (3), knowledge institutes (1), 
and producers of biogas production installations (1). 
For the interviews we used a semi-structured 
questionnaire with open-ended questions. The 
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questions addressed the roles and positions of 
stakeholders within the green gas production chain, 
the stakeholders’ goals, (access to) resources, 
collaboration between stakeholders, ways to organize 
green gas demonstration projects, ways to exercise 
power in decision-making, problems experienced in 
operational projects, and windows of opportunity for 
green gas niche development. Next to conducting 
interviews site visits to agricultural biogas production 
plants were undertaken. Data were collected between 
2011 and 2012.  
It was only after the data collection that the 
authors decided that five primary stakeholders for 
regional green gas demonstration projects were to be 
analysed: producers of biogas (in this case dairy 
farmers), energy (gas) grid operators, energy 
companies, end-consumers, and local governments.  
 
3. Green gas from manure-based anaerobic co-
digestion 
 
In the Netherlands, anaerobic co-digestion 
with manure is defined as: “the micro-biological 
conversion of animals’ excrements with co-substrates 
into biogas and digestate” (Agentschap, 2011b). In 
this paper green gas is defined as ‘biogas which is 
upgraded to natural gas quality standards’, and we 
only look at green gas which is upgraded from biogas 
produced from farm-scale co-digestion. Fig. 1 is a 
schematic of the green gas value chain, which is 
central to our paper.   
Central to a biogas plant is the anaerobic 
digester where microbes convert manure and co-
products into biogas and digestate. The second 
product, digestate (processed manure and co-
products), can (theoretically) after stabilization be 
used as an organic soil amendment or a fertilizer 
(Geels and Raven, 2007). The digestate can be sold 
as manure depending upon the composition of the 
input sources (IPCC, 2011).  
Biogas is produced from anaerobic digestion 
of manure and co-products (which increase methane 
production during the anaerobic digestion process). 
The addition of co-products - organic waste sources 
(e.g., fish oil, slaughterhouse residues, or maize) - 
increases biogas yields, and therefore makes the 
process more profitable, and thus more attractive for 
farmers to take on biogas production as a sideline to 
their farming activities. In the Netherlands, not all 
organic sources are allowed as feedstock for co-
digestion. Central government has issued a limitative 
list of substances and sources that can be used: the 
so-called ‘positive list’ (Agentschap, 2011b). As of 1 
January 2013, a voluntary certification system for co-
digestion feedstock is also in force. Putting waste in 
biomass sources legislation is an effort taken by both 
the Dutch and European governments (Mckay et al., 
2006) but has proven a challenge. 
In 2011 biogas was produced at some 113 
locations in the Netherlands. The scale of the 
digestion sites ranged from small (<135 Nm3) to 
large (>270 Nm3) (Agentschap, 2011c). Since their 
introduction biogas installations have become 
substantially larger, and more complex, (RIVM, 
2010). There are four ways to transform biogas to 
useful forms of energy (Bekkering et al., 2010): (i) 
production of electricity; (ii) production of heat; (iii) 
production of heat and electricity; (iv) upgrading to 
green gas and injection in the gas grid. Before biogas 
is used, contaminations need to be removed 
(especially corrosive hydrogen sulfide).  
Because many biogas production sites are 
located in geographically remote areas, far away 
from heat load (demand) centers, and on-site 
applications are often absent, direct (local) use of 
low-caloric heat from raw biogas is usually 
(economically) difficult. Therefore, biogas 
production from co-digestion with manure is (still) 
not profitable, and most plants operate with financial 
support from the Dutch government. Until 2012 
government support (by means of the MEP and SDE 
schemes) only applied to ‘green power’ production. 
The schemes offered a fixed yield price per kWh 
produced, and were not responsive to cost 
fluctuations (which is attractive if production costs 
do not exceed the fixed yield price). Government 
support for heat production and green gas production 
from biogas only started into existence in 2012. As a 
consequence, before 2012 the only feasible 
alternative was injecting the produced biogas into a 
locally operating gas motor or CHP engine for 
electricity (and heat) production. 
 
Fig. 1. Green gas value chain 
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The excess electricity produced was then fed 
directly into the grid. Using biogas for electricity 
generation is considered a very inefficient way to 
utilize biogas and produce energy (for the yield is 
only 40%). Upgrading to green gas and injecting into 
the natural gas grid is considered much more 
efficient (the yield is approximately 80%) (Rabobank 
Food & Agri, 2013), and offers greater added value 
(also due to the many ways in which it can be used). 
For green gas production, all producing activities can 
either be done at one large central location (which we 
call ‘model 1’ in this paper) or at multiple, 
decentralized locations (which we call ‘model 2’) 
(Bekkering et al., 2010).  
All current operational green gas plants in the 
Netherlands (thirteen in total) are based on ‘model 1’, 
and feature other production feedstock than 
agricultural animal manure (e.g., landfill organic 
feedstock or sewer sludge). Theoretically speaking, 
expectations for green gas production are positive if 
significant economies of scale can be achieved with 
multiple cattle farms producing biogas, transporting 
it to a central location, where it is upgraded into 
green gas and injected into the natural gas grid. As 
compared to ‘model 1’ this allows for profitability in 
agricultural areas with vast amounts of surplus 
manure. For this reason, ‘model 2’ is considered a 
realistic future model by central government and the 
regional gas grid operators. Several regional 
demonstration projects have been set up to test the 
feasibility of this model. We consider the ‘BioNOF’ 
case a striking example.  
An important precondition to making ‘model 
2’ work, is the development of a ‘biogas 
infrastructure’. In the ‘BioNOF’ case this takes the 
form of a low pressure gas pipeline, which allows 
multiple farm-scale biogas production plants to be 
connected to a central location, where biogas is 
upgraded from biogas to green gas standards (in 
terms of chemical composition, caloric value, Wobbe 
index, and pressure; Schoemaker, 2012), and then 
injected into the natural gas grid. As a rule of thumb, 
green gas production sites require an annual 
production of at least 5 Million Nm3 gas to cover the 
costs for upgrading biogas to green gas (Rabobank 
Food & Agri, 2013).  
Because such biogas infrastructures are not 
regulated under the provisions of the Dutch Gas Act, 
there is no pre-determined legal owner (in contrast to 
other countries, like Germany). Hence, stakeholders, 
who could potentially benefit from the biogas 
infrastructure, are left to decide on the distribution of 
the investment costs (for instance, between a number 
of potential biogas producers, the regional gas grid 
operator and an energy company). Furthermore, 
biogas infrastructures are not regulated in the 
Netherlands. As a consequence – theoretically 
speaking - anyone is allowed to construct, operate, 
maintain, and exploit biogas infrastructures (in 
contrast to natural gas infrastructures, which are 
legally reserved to gas grid operators). Because of 
potential negative environmental impacts, permits 
have to be requested by the owner(s) of the biogas 
plants and biogas infrastructure. The legal issuing 
authority for permit requests for ‘model 2’ plant sites 
is the municipality. Large-sized plants typically also 
require exemption from current country planning 
regulations, which also requires the involvement of 
regional government (the ‘province’) in the permit 
request procedure, with a consequent increase in 
complexity.  
 
4. Results and discussion 
 
Five key stakeholders were identified in the 
regional green gas project arena: (i) biogas 
producers, (ii) the gas grid operator, (iii) the energy 
supply company, (iv) end-consumers, and (v) local 
government. These stakeholders are active in 
consecutive links of the green gas value chain: 
livestock farmers produce and upgrade biogas into 
green gas, the grid operators transport green gas, and 
the energy company supplies green gas to the end-
consumer who uses it.  
Local government grants permits for biogas 
plants and infrastructure. If regional green gas 
demonstration projects are to be successful it is 
necessary for these stakeholders to interact, align 
visions, design operational plans, negotiate and 
exchange resources. In the next sub-sections for each 
stakeholder we address: expectations about the 
assumed advantages of engaging in green gas 
business; the stakeholder’s role in the green gas value 
chain, use and access to resources; and experienced 
problems and challenges.  
 
4.1. Biogas producers 
 
Biogas production is an interesting 
proposition to intensive livestock farmers. In our case 
study the farmers concerned are dairy farmers with 
surplus manure, for a variety of reasons. First, biogas 
production offers a sideline to farmers apart from 
their primary economic activities, with potential 
economic benefits.  
Biogas production allows them to monetize 
their manure surplus, which was previously only 
considered a burden, due to its mandatory disposal 
(involving high costs) due to strict manure 
regulations which severely restrict the use of manure 
as fertilizer on agricultural land (for soil protection). 
Costs for transport and disposal of manure are 
substantial (e.g., between €4 - 8 per Nm3 for liquid 
pig manure) (Agrimedia, 2012). Second, using 
organic residues, especially manure, allows farmers 
to capture potential methane emissions and emissions 
of other Greenhouse Gases (GHG’s), before they are 
emitted into the air. Given the recent attention to 
climate mitigation, policy schemes have arisen that 
encourage farmers to actively lower GHG emissions. 
The agricultural sector’s representative body is 
participating in a multilateral agreement with central 
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government on the limitation of GHG emissions, in 
particular methane which is considered exceptionally 
harmful (Min. VROM, 2007). Methane capture also 
fits in well with new manure policy, which compels 
farmers from livestock-intensive regions in the 
Netherlands to monitor and record their manure 
disposal, utilization and emissions (Min. EL&I, 
2011b).  
In order to achieve economies of scale (and 
thus to run a profitable business) a sufficient number 
of farmers need to collaborate. They need to organize 
themselves into cooperative business enterprises 
(which could well be related to a dairy or manure 
cooperative), and decide, for instance, on the 
resources needed (in terms of manure, co-products, 
and manpower), how to organize the logistics (most 
likely by hiring a transport subcontractor), how to 
transport the produced biogas, and how to allocate 
costs and benefits. Following this line of argument, it 
comes as little surprise that it is often farmer co-
operatives (and manure transport contractors) who 
start up and run biogas production plants (Andringa 
and Hoppe, 2012). Furthermore, potential biogas 
producers need to formulate a strategy for 
speculating on and purchasing sufficient co-substrate 
materials.  
Since the purchase and speculation on co-
product stocks occurs at a large scale (especially in 
Germany, with its heavily subsidized biogas plants 
and profitable feed-in tariffs for green power), 
negative spillovers to other markets have occurred. In 
particular, the negative pricing effects on feedstock 
and food markets (due to extensive maize crop 
cultivation) have drawn adverse attention to energy 
production from co-digestion (Natuur en Milieu, 
2011). Furthermore, due to a shortage in the supply 
of, increased market demand for, and price 
speculation on co-products, substrate prices continue 
to rise rapidly. More generally, costs for co-
feedstocks, such as maize, have risen over the years, 
which in turn have had a negative influence on the 
financial viability of biogas and green gas projects 
(Rabobank Food & Agri, 2012). Several biogas 
projects in Germany were closed down for this 
reason in 2012 (Rabobank Food & Agri, 2013). 
Besides the problem of rising co-product 
prices, there are many operational problems. First of 
all, up-front investments in the (co-)digestion 
installation are high: between €4.6 million euros (E-
Kwadraat, 2008) and €5.5 million per plant 
(Agentschap, 2011c) in 2008. Other capital 
investments are needed besides the (co-) digester, 
such  storage capacity for manure, substrate materials 
and digestate; pre-processing installations; and 
innovative livestock barns that permit the quick 
capture of manure (to prevent loss of methane, and 
hence loss of biogas yield). Apart from the physical 
infrastructure, skilled personnel need to be hired 
before biogas plants can commence operations. All 
of this requires bank loans and credits for the up-
front investments. Since 2011, it has become very 
difficult for cattle farmers to access bank loans 
because of the strict standards banks have started to 
apply to credit lending for renewable energy projects 
(fearful as the banks are of uncertainties, especially 
profitability). 
A study by Rabobank Food & Agri (2011) on 
behalf of the largest credit supplier in the the Dutch 
agricultural sector, (Rabobank) estimated that two-
thirds of all manure (co) digestion plants are 
unprofitable in operation. Central government 
subsidies in the Netherlands (from 2003 MEP, from 
2008 SDE, and from 2011 SDE+) are used in 
compensation. Notwithstanding its obvious benefits, 
the SDE+ subsidy scheme also features some 
significant uncertainties for potential farm-scale 
biogas producers.  As there are many requests for the 
subsidy, a strict selection procedure is applied, 
following the rule that renewable energy has to be 
generated at the lowest cost. This disfavors green gas 
projects as the unit production costs are relatively 
high compared to alternative renewable energy routes 
(especially solar). Furthermore, the SDE+ selection 
procedure tends to prefer large-scale plants over 
small ones. In other words, if subsidy requests are to 
be successful, potential biogas producers (and other 
participants) have to collaborate and request the 
subsidy jointly, since individual requests stand little 
chance. Moreover, the grant of a subsidy does not 
automatically mean that biogas producers can start 
building their plants. According to Rabobank Food & 
Agri (2012) “a large majority of SDE+ 2011 biogas 
and green gas projects have tendered for and been 
granted support at too low a level to be financially 
viable. As a result these projects will not be realized 
…”. “Part of the (SDE+) budget is thus consumed by 
projects that are not going to be able to attract 
financing ….” More generally, Rabobank is highly 
skeptical about the futures of biogas and green gas. 
In fact, the bank has even decided to drop these 
modalities from its future renewable energy 
investment strategy. As a consequence, it will be 
(even more) difficult for livestock farmers who want 
to start producing biogas to get a loan from 
Rabobank.   
Besides a subsidy, the entrepreneur who wants 
to start a biogas plant (for reasons of economies of 
scale, this is typically a ‘model 2’ plant) also needs a 
permit for (i) construction, and (ii) use. This applies 
to the issue of selecting the digester’s location, which 
takes into consideration suitability in terms of 
physical planning, acceptable traffic conditions, 
energy-efficiency, and economic feasibility (LTO, 
2005). The larger the digester the greater the chance 
that these conditions will not be met. Although 
farmers are permitted to run small-scale digesters on 
their own property, they are not allowed to build 
large-scale digesters, since these can only be 
established on specially earmarked industrial parks, 
for environmental and safety reasons. In practice this 
is a major problem, as established firms located on 
industrial sites are reluctant to accept digesters near 
them for reasons such as image and nuisance caused 
by traffic movements (Noordelijke Rekenkamer, 
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2013). As a consequence, in some regions it is nearly 
impossible to find suitable locations for building 
biogas digesters. As a consequence, promising local 
‘green’ initiatives, like the ‘Zijldijk’ case in the 
province of Groningen, have been terminated 
(Noordelijke Rekenkamer, 2013). 
The entrepreneur, of course, is reluctant to 
incur investments before the permits are granted. In 
practice, the permit granting process is considered 
(by the entrepreneurs concerned) to be quite complex 
(CCS, 2010) and not without risk. Permit granting 
processes can cause serious delay to plant 
construction. There are two aspects to this problem. 
First, as with other bio-energy applications, 
municipalities do not yet have specific biogas or 
green gas policies in place. As a consequence there 
are few staff, trained and specialized in how to deal 
with permit requests for co-digestion plants (van 
Gestel, 2006). Hence, there is often a lack of 
expertise. Furthermore, the physical planning 
requirements are quite strict (as biogas production 
and green gas upgrading are not considered 
‘agricultural activities’), which thus cuts the number 
of available, potentially suitable sites. If a site does 
not meet the criteria, then a procedure to gain 
exemption from the local physical planning has to be 
initiated (Agentschap, 2011b), which itself is a rather 
complex procedure, and therefore time consuming. 
The second problem is related to the first.  
The permit procedures leave ample room for 
legal appeals. This can form a substantial problem for 
the entrepreneur, since many people living or 
working near the plant will oppose its construction 
and operation for reasons that have to do with 
nuisance, such as: (i) an aesthetic misfit with the 
surrounding landscape (due to the shape of the 
digester and storage tanks); (ii) transport movements 
necessary for the transportation of co-products and 
digestate are noisy, may block the typically narrow 
roads in rural areas and cause additional maintenance 
due to road erosion, and may cause leakages of 
potentially harmful substances; and (iii) the plant 
itself may emit substances that can cause unwanted 
odor in the neighboring area (Agentschap, 2011b). In 
recent years, many permit requests for the 
construction of biogas plant have encountered 
considerable resistance from local communities, who 
opposed construction in their immediate 
neighborhood. In two cases (‘Texel’, 2007; 
‘Coevorden’, 2012), opponents of the grant of a 
permit filed their cases with the Council of State 
(‘Raad van State’ in Dutch), which were approved, 
leading to case-law (i.e. the ‘Texel’ case, stating that 
digesters do not automatically comply with 
agricultural planning regulations, which makes a 
legal exemption procedure mandatory), which in turn 
put several biogas projects on hold (Boerderij, 2008). 
The legal appeals by local residents are not 
made without reason, since biogas production is 
associated with serious risks to safety, health and the 
environment. Due to the increased price of maize, 
entrepreneurial activities have spread to markets 
formerly not known for co-feedstock supply to co-
digestion (such as slaughterhouse wastes and other 
animal organic materials). This is potentially very 
dangerous, due to the risk of chemical reactions 
producing hydrogen sulfide. In 2005, in 
Rhadereistedt (Nordrhein-Westfalen, Germany) three 
biogas plant workers and a truck driver were killed in 
an accident at a biogas production plant due to 
exposure to volatile hydrogen sulfide (Schmitz, 
2005). Besides the danger to on-site personnel, 
biogas plants may also pose a hazard to their direct 
surroundings. In February 2012, a biogas plant in 
Coevorden, the Netherlands, caused odor nuisance in 
a residential area located directly adjacent to the 
plant. The odor was caused by leakage of hydrogen 
sulfise from the co-digestion installation. In response 
the local authority decided to pre-emptively evacuate 
all residents living in the nearby residential area. The 
case was broadcast nationally on public television 
(KRO-Reporter, 2012).  
These events raise questions as to whether it is 
prudent to allow livestock farmers, whose farm is 
located in the direct vicinity of places where other 
people live and work, to speculate on organic co-
feedstocks and produce their own chemical substrate 
mix for anaerobic digestion. As a consequence of 
accidents like this, the Dutch central government 
launched an enforcement pilot project (VROM-
Inspectie, 2011), which has shown that, although 
most biogas producers are compliant, some rule 
violation does occur, while knowledge of co-
digestion feedstock mixing is considered ‘complex’, 
and therefore difficult to understand and apply in 
operational management. In January 2013, 
enforcement was intensified (by means of spot 
sampling checks on co-feedstocks and digestion 
mixtures). Farmers who violate the regulations face 
suspension of their subsidy grants, recovery of 
previously paid subsidy money, or withdrawal of 
their permits to produce biogas. 2013 was considered 
a ‘pilot year’: If the results had only a limited 
effectiveness (i.e., too many rule violations), the 
policy for co-feedstock materials subsidies would be 
reconsidered (Vermaas, 2013). 
Once the plant is built, operational 
management demands a lot of time and attention 
from the entrepreneur. Government campaigns, 
designed to convince farmers to start producing 
biogas, often downplay or neglect this aspect. The 
installation, in particular the microbial colony, needs 
time to become active; once operational it needs 
almost constant feeding with manure and co-products 
to remain operational. Moreover, the plant needs to 
run at full capacity.  
The co-digester is vulnerable to different 
forms of pollution (such as plastics, sand, twigs and 
stones) that may end up in the feedstock and risk 
ending the chemical biogas production process, 
which leads to weeks-long loss of income. In sum, 
the biogas plant requires specific knowledge from the 
entrepreneur about its operational management. This 
aspect is often underestimated. 
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Once the gas has been produced, the biogas 
needs to be transported to a central location for 
upgrading to green gas. The plant owners need to 
decide how to divide the up-front investment and 
maintenance costs for the biogas infrastructure and 
biogas upgrading installation. Moreover, they need to 
get permission from the regional gas grid operator to 
be allowed to inject green gas into the (conventional, 
natural) gas grid. This requires the producers to meet 
green gas quality standards (such as the right 
methane content, Wobbe index, calorific value, and 
pressure), which requires investments in material for 
feed-in following the rules set by the regional gas 
grid operators. Such investments include: 
measurement equipment, connection to the central 
gas grid, odorisation, gas conditioning, and 
compression to the required pressure (de Bruijn, 
2011). Costs for feed-in are between €340,000 and 
€900,000, assuming feed-in of 550 Nm3 green gas 
per hour on an 8 Bar gas grid (de Bruijn, 2011).  
Collection and treatment of decentrally 
produced biogas can be problematic and expensive 
when biogas derives from multiple production plants. 
Due to the relative freedom biogas producers have in 
using co-products it comes as little surprise that 
biogas streams with varying chemical compositions 
are delivered for centralized upgrading to green gas. 
This requires expensive pre-treatment before 
injection to the gas grid. This, in turn, leads to 
uncertainties, difficult decision making processes, 
and stress in relation to cost distribution among 
biogas producers, the gas grid operator, and (in some 
cases like ‘BioNOF’) energy companies. 
  
4.2. Gas grid operators 
 
Under the Gas Act, gas grid operators are 
solely responsible for the construction, management 
and maintenance of gas grids. Following the 
liberalization of the Dutch energy sector, gas grid 
operators have regional monopolies, and are 
therefore closely controlled by the Dutch anti-
competition authority NMA, which strictly limits the 
gas grid operators’ operational and strategic 
marketing activities, to prevent them from raising 
tariffs for gas transportation and connections to the 
gas grid. 
Nevertheless, there many reasons why green 
gas injection to the gas grid is an interesting 
proposition to the gas grid operators (recall that green 
gas does not have to come from biogas producing 
farmers, but also from other producers, such as 
sewage plants and landfill operators). Green gas 
offers a new niche market for the gas grid operators. 
Compared to local biogas applications, green gas 
offers the benefits that it can be mixed with natural 
gas and used throughout the country. More generally, 
not being limited to local use offers economies of 
scale, and thus offers an interesting proposition to the 
gas grid operators. As mentioned in section 1, there 
are high expectations about the growth of the green 
gas market. Therefore, there is a belief that investing 
in green gas development now will offer future 
market benefits as gas grid operators become early-
market pioneers in green gas. This allows them to 
learn now and gain a competitive advantage. In that 
way, current investments in green gas demonstration 
projects can be perceived as strategic investments, 
which will offer positive returns in the long run. 
Although green gas offers benefits, the gas 
grid operators also face many barriers. First, there are 
operational problems, such as the injection of green 
gas into the natural gas grid. The fact is that there is 
too little capacity in many places in the natural gas 
grid to inject the full green gas capacity throughout 
the year.  
One can only inject as much gas into the grid 
as the amount that goes out (during a 24-hour day; 
variation between parts of the day is possible, 
though). Furthermore, demand for gas is not stable 
throughout the year. Demand is lower in particular 
during the summer than in winter, and is more 
intermittent. As a consequence, green gas suppliers 
run into problems because they produce fixed 
quantities. “The microbe populations in the digester 
cannot just simply switch off” (Stichting Groen Gas 
Nederland, 2011). Second, since gas quality for 
injection in the natural gas grid needs to meet legally 
prescribed standards, it is important that biogas 
producers supply biogas of comparable (or rather, 
fixed) chemical composition. In practice, this is 
rather difficult because biogas producers are allowed 
– within the boundaries of the so-called ‘positive list’ 
of co-products - to select co-products for anaerobic 
digestion themselves. Due to the co-products’ 
scarcity, price-rises, and speculation there is variation 
in the feedstock processed for biogas production by 
different producers. Regional gas grid operators are 
thus very dependent on the quality of green gas 
delivered by the producers. 
There is a legal issue resulting from the 
provisions of the Gas Act that constrains gas grid 
operators in their efforts to operate biogas 
infrastructures. Construction, management and 
maintenance of biogas infrastructures are not 
considered a ‘non-regulated task’, but a ‘non-
regulated activity’, which implies that gas grid 
operators operate as market parties when it comes to 
transport of biogas in biogas infrastructures, and not 
as semi-public utility organizations (which is the case 
when they transport only natural gas, their actual, 
legally prescribed function). In practice, this means 
that gas grid operators are not permitted to finance 
biogas activities from their regular activities. 
Exploitation of biogas infrastructures hence requires 
them to use competitive market prices. From a 
financial-economic perspective this is unfavorable, 
which leads gas grid operators to depreciate their 
investments within short periods. As a consequence, 
the additional costs lead to higher green gas prices, 
which in the end are also passed on to the end-
consumer. In the meantime, the gas grid operators 
must guarantee that the green gas quality meets 
natural gas standards in order to provide end-
 
Agricultural green gas demonstration projects in the Netherlands. A stakeholder analysis 
   
 3091
consumers with the quality standards of natural gas. 
Failure to meet the regular quality standard will lead 
immediately to a loss of credibility for green gas as a 
substitute for conventional natural gas. Furthermore, 
a legal permit is required to ensure that green gas 
meets natural gas standards to avoid hazardous and 
other harmful situations.  
The distribution of the investment costs in the 
biogas infrastructure is of major importance to the 
green gas demonstration project. In contrast to 
Germany, it is not just the gas grid operator who is 
expected to make the investments required, and who 
is responsible for operational management and 
maintenance. In the Netherlands, other potential 
beneficiaries of the biogas grid are also expected to 
share the burden. In the ‘Bionof’ case a practical 
solution was found to resolve this issue. The biogas 
pipeline is to be constructed, managed, and 
maintained by the gas grid operator as an 
‘unregulated activity’ (outside the scope of the Dutch 
Gas Act). The biogas pipeline will be owned by the 
gas grid operator. Until the pipeline is operational, 
the gas grid operator puts up half of the investments 
with other participants. Once the pipeline is 
operational, the grid operator participates in a joint 
venture. The contract partner in the joint venture is 
the energy company, which books transport capacity 
and rewards the joint venture with reasonable 
compensation. This financial solution theoretically 
lowers the threshold for gas operators to invest in 
uncertain projects and technologies, like green gas 
(something which they have become more reluctant 
to engage in, in recent years).  
Participation in green gas projects is, 
however, not just a decision gas grid operators take 
only from an individual financial-economic business 
perspective. Governments also have a majority 
shareholding, and are theoretically in the position to 
exercise ‘public share ownership, and hence 
influence decision making, including corporate 
strategy. In reality, however, governments are hardly 
involved in the operational and strategic management 
of regional system operators.   
 
4.3. The energy company 
 
First of all, energy companies should be 
viewed for the purposes of this paper as ‘energy 
traders’, not producers, since as they only buy and 
sell green gas. The most important reason for them to 
participate in green gas projects is that green gas can 
be perceived as a potentially profitable side-line: 
green gas as a sustainable alternative to natural gas. 
Energy companies nowadays face external drivers 
that encourage them to consider green gas as an 
important alternative to their prime business. In the 
years to come the European Union will urge energy 
companies to produce, (or) buy and sell increasingly 
larger shares of renewable energy. Moreover, selling 
green gas could be financially and economically 
interesting to energy companies for their trade in 
‘green certificates’ (or ‘bio-tickets’ in case green gas 
is used for mobility purposes) (ECN, 2012), although 
they are not designed to cover more than just 
unprofitable investments. Like other emission 
certificates, energy companies can sell these 
certificates (with CO2 emission rights) to potential 
polluters elsewhere. Furthermore, green certificates 
also allow energy companies to speculate on the 
carbon price market. It is not surprising, therefore, 
that it is energy companies that are initiating and 
leading large-scale green gas demonstration projects 
(such as the ‘BioNOF’ case). Energy companies are 
currently in the position to gain a (competitive) lead 
over their peers by participating in green gas projects. 
Moreover, the energy companies’ expectations match 
the Dutch government’s energy transition vision, in 
which the green gas innovation route is well 
positioned. Another reason for participating in green 
gas projects stems from corporate social 
responsibility. It is seen as way to project the 
company’s ‘green image’, and helps with branding to 
ecologically oriented customers, who might be 
inclined to buy their gas, which will be perceived as 
‘clean’ and ‘reliable’.  
Besides the expected benefits, energy 
companies also face barriers. First, the energy 
companies are not clear about what they can expect 
from the gas grid operators. In principle, they want to 
involve the grid operators because of their expertise 
and know-how in the safe, efficient operation of (bio-
) gas grids. This, however, is rather a false 
expectation as the grid operator is legally not 
permitted to act as a public actor (because the biogas 
grid is not a gas grid according to Dutch law) and 
apply the public competence to the operation and 
management of biogas grids, in contrast to what it 
does when operating conventional natural gas grids. 
For this reason, gas grid operators are expected to 
construct, operate and maintain biogas grids under 
market conditions (since this is a ‘non-regulated 
activity’).  
In practice this makes it difficult for energy 
companies to enter into business negotiations with 
gas grid operators. Second, like the gas grid 
operators, energy companies depend on cattle 
farmers to produce biogas. They have to cope with 
the uncertainties their contract partners face 
(upstream in the green gas production chain). Third, 
energy companies have to beware that the green gas 
price (the price for which they sell to end-consumers) 
will not get too high, especially since it is already 
more expensive than conventional natural gas.  
  
4.4. The end-consumer 
 
End-consumers are interested in using green 
gas for its potential price advantages – especially 
when they consider that the future price of 
conventional natural gas will rise, as well as the 
‘green’ image green gas offers. Although awareness 
of renewable energy is increasing among citizens, it 
does not mean, however, that the large majority are 
sufficiently well informed. Since the liberalization of 
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the energy sector, end-consumers have been to buy 
energy from their preferred energy company. 
Basically, therefore, the end-consumer is empowered 
to select the energy company that promises the 
cleanest green gas (in the gas mix) for the lowest 
price, comparable to buying ‘green electricity from a 
generating company. Because green gas is injected 
into the conventional gas grid, it can be utilized 
throughout the country. Like natural gas, green gas 
can be utilized for central heating of living spaces, or 
water, or for cooking. Green gas can alternatively be 
used as a fuel for gas-fired cars.  
Alternatively, and if the location parameters 
are right, end-consumers can also be in a position to 
purchase locally produced green gas (or alternatively 
biogas, with modifications to their gas boilers). 
Green gas could also be utilized as fuel for district 
heating in residential areas or business parks, and for 
combined heat and power (Krozer et al., 2008). Local 
production and use of green gas in a district heating 
scheme might be useful to achieve high energy 
efficiency performance in residential dwellings. Once 
these dwellings are connected to the green gas-
fuelled district heating system, they might be 
awarded an energy performance certificate, which 
indicates the dwelling’s high energy efficiency 
potential, and indirectly positively influence the 
dwelling’s market price. This could be a driver for 
(future) home owners to connect.  
Nonetheless, in the case of neighborhood 
development and other forms of new housing 
construction, home owners and tenants depend on 
project management, municipal officials and project 
developers whether their dwellings are to be 
connected to a green gas grid or district heating 
system. Furthermore, district heating brings with it 
the end-consumers’ norm of ‘not paying more than in 
any other case’ (e.g., the natural gas price). When 
green gas prices rise (e.g., due to the increasing 
prices of co-products), it might leads to financial 
feasibility problems when end-consumers start to 
demand that they should not pay more than usual. 
Finally, there are local opportunities with firms 
organizing to collectively purchase green gas for 
local use on business park sites (in park management 
contracts). 
 
4.5. Local government 
 
Local governments play an important role 
because they grant (or do not grant) permits for the 
construction and use of farm-scale biogas production 
plants. This is of great importance, because it is 
known to be one of the major barriers to the 
development of local bio- and green gas projects. 
Failures to grant permit requests mostly have their 
origin in legal appeals by stakeholders who live or 
work nearby the (planned) biogas plant, due to their 
fear of potential nuisance (such as malodor, noise, or 
spoiled outlook). Failures to grant permits are often 
blamed on civil servants who lack detailed 
(regulatory, technological) knowledge, or requests 
interpreted in rather latitudinarian ways. 
Furthermore, there may be organizational problems 
within local governments. Public officials from 
different departments (the environmental and finance 
departments, for instance) may have divergent goals, 
which are incompatible, thus leading to conflicts 
which turn out to be disadvantageous to decisions on 
green local gas initiatives. Green gas utilization is 
interesting to local governments because it 
contributes to the achievement of their climate policy 
goals (meeting previously set political goals in terms 
of CO2 emissions prevented). There are two ways for 
them to do this: first, by adopting measures to utilize 
green gas themselves or, second, to encourage 
utilization of green gas by local stakeholders. More 
generally, local governments are in the position to 
create a substantial local demand for green gas.  
The guiding theory in this case is that creation 
of a sufficient degree of market demand will 
automatically cause the local green gas supply to 
follow. In order to achieve this, local government 
could deploy several policy instruments: support of 
entrepreneurs in the legal procedures for requesting a 
permit, granting investment subsidies, information 
campaigns, addressing green gas utilization in project 
development, and by encouraging the collective 
utilization of green gas in business parks (park 
management, which has the advantage of demand-
side economies of scale). Furthermore, green gas 
projects, like other renewable energy projects, are 
often used by local governments to gain public 
attention and exposure. In the ‘BioNOF’ case, for 
instance, the municipality of Leeuwarden used the 
green gas case extensively to position itself in the 
‘Energy Valley’ network of the Northern provinces. 
Finally, local governments may be in the 
position to support green gas projects as a (public) 
shareholder in gas grid operator companies, which – 
theoretically - offers opportunities to influence 
corporate decision making and budget allocation to 
green gas projects. 
 
4.6. Discussion 
 
In sum, there are many operational, financial-
economic, environmental, safety, legal and -
administrative limitations that block the success of 
agricultural green gas demonstration projects. Most 
stakeholders are striving to achieve their own goals – 
foremost among them being maximizing their 
financial-economic gains.  
However, they depend firmly on each other. 
For most of them, green gas production and 
distribution is still unprofitable. Therefore, subsidies 
are (and remain) necessary as financial compensation 
(both investment subsidy and feed-in tariff subsidy), 
and collaboration is a conditio sine qua non. Due to a 
plethora of uncertainties, stakeholders are reluctant to 
invest their capital in projects, especially the biogas 
grid, which still is legally unregulated. For potential 
biogas producers this can easily be understood, as 
they face the lions’ share of the investments and 
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uncertainties, so they are reluctant to invest, and 
nothing happens. The Dutch legal framework (in this 
case the Gas Act) – in contract to other countries, 
notably Germany – does not, for instance, compel the 
grid operators to construct new pipelines when a new 
producer wants to inject green gas into the 
conventional gas pipeline.  
Given the barriers we have identified, green 
gas from farm-scale co-digestion emerges as a niche 
that cannot easily ‘be left to the market’. If the niche 
is to become viable, and goals like those set by the 
grid operators in 2012 are to be attained, policy 
change is necessary as stakeholders currently lack the 
incentives to develop the green gas niche on their 
own.  
Following the problems identified we 
formulated policy recommendations that could 
enable the respective stakeholders to cope with these 
problems. An overview of the key problems and 
policy recommendations per stakeholder is presented 
in Table 1. 
 
5. Conclusions and perspectives 
 
The aim of this paper was to contribute to an 
understanding of demonstration projects in which 
green gas is produced by livestock farmers via 
biomass co-digestion. We have focused on the 
stakeholders’ perspectives and identified barriers 
accordingly.  
Furthermore, we were interested in 
discovering whether public interests are safeguarded 
in the production and supply process of green gas. 
We applied a stakeholder analysis to identify key 
stakeholders, their motivations, resources, 
interrelations with other stakeholders, and define 
problems they face when engaging in the green gas 
production chain.  
 
Table 1. Overview of key barriers experienced per stakeholders, and policy recommendations based on those 
 
Stakeholder Experienced barriers to engage in green gas production chain activities Policy recommendations 
Biogas 
producers 
(live stock 
farmers) 
1)  Collaboration between multiple livestock farmers is 
required to realize economies of scale production. 
Involving more of them in collaboration efforts, 
however, increases complexity in decision-making. 
2)  Negative spillovers to food markets (due to use of 
particular crops as ingredients for co-digestion). 
3)  Substantial price increase of particular co-feedstock 
deemed essential for co-digestion. Related to heavy 
regulation on co-feedstock allowance in co-digestion 
production. 
4)  Need for substantial upfront investments and 
maintenance costs. At the same time increased 
difficulty to attract loans from banks. 
5)  Operational management of production plants is 
time consuming, requires specialized knowledge and 
skills; hence, it is more than just the side activity 
livestock farmers expect. 
6)  Uncertainties that go with the SDE+ subsidy scheme 
allocation system. 
7)  Potential harm to humans, animals and the 
environment (incl. diffusion of cattle diseases via 
transport of organic co-feedstocks to and from central 
co-digestion plants). 
8)  Increased difficulty to get required legal 
(environmental) permits due to increased spatial zoning 
restrictions and room for legal appeals by local 
community members resisting construction and 
operation of biogas plants in their ‘backyards’. 
9)  Costs and risks that go with collection and 
centralized treatment of biogas and feed-in of green gas 
to the gas grid. Grid operators determine the conditions 
to which biogas producers need to comply, and have 
ample incentives to make investments themselves. This 
results in unequal financial burdens and risks in up-
front investments to biogas producers. 
10) Uncertainties related to investments and 
profitability of biogas infrastructures. They need 
substantial upfront investments, and livestock farmers 
cannot be expected to make the investments alone.     
1) Use of a collective investment fund to solve problems 
regarding the upfront investment ‘deadlock’ in biogas 
production, treatment equipment and biogas 
infrastructures. A public investment fund could help to 
increase investment conditions. 
2) Development of business and organizational models 
that convince and support livestock farmers to start 
collaborating in green gas projects with sufficient 
substantial economies of scale concerning biogas 
production, whereas costs and benefits are shared equally 
between project partners. Process-, network-  and 
transition management (alignment of visions, 
experimenting, learning, management of expectations) is 
key in joint efforts. 
3) Development of a program about knowledge provision 
and training of livestock farmers on how to manage and 
operate biogas production plants.  
4) The SDE+ subsidy scheme needs to give more 
opportunities to small-scale (and collaborative) biogas 
production plants. Furthermore, policy makers should let 
go of the ‘lowest cost per unit of renewable energy 
produced’ rule that applies to the SDE+ scheme, since 
this does not stimulate innovation, in particular vis-à-vis 
agricultural green gas production. 
5) Development of regulatory or tax incentives that allow 
for affordable co-feedstock. 
6) Development of procedures and training of local 
government civil servants to deal with permit granting for 
biogas plant and infrastructure construction smoothly. In 
addition spatial designated areas can be assigned on 
which favorable conditions apply vis-à-vis construction 
and operation of biogas production plants.   
Grid 
operators 
1)  Uncertainties related to injection of green gas by 
farmers, e.g. quality of green gas (e.g., chemical 
composition, pressure), lack of capacity in many 
places, unstable gas demand by consumers leading to 
1)  Regulation of ‘biogas grids’ with the Dutch Gas Act 
to lower perceived uncertainties about legal implications 
of biogas infrastructure construction and operation. 
2)  Clear regulation of what grid operators are allowed to 
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unbalance in gas grids, lack of gas storage capacity. 
2)  Limited scope of actions following limitations to 
grid operators set in the Dutch Gas Act (as ‘non-
regulated activities’; hence grid operators do not 
operate as a public entity in biogas grids). No 
allowance to finance biogas activities form regular 
activities. A biogas grid is not a gas grid according to 
the Dutch Gas Act. Grid operators are, hence, bound to 
operate biogas grids under market conditions. 
do and what not to do regarding investments, operation 
and management of biogas grids. Currently, there is 
hardly any incentive for grid operators to invest in biogas 
grids. Despite their skills and knowhow the role of grid 
operators is biogas grid management is diffuse, and 
perhaps unnecessarily limited. Perhaps lessons can be 
learnt from practices in other countries.  
Energy 
companies 
1) Dependency on grid operators and biogas producers 
(and hence vulnerable to price setting for biogas 
production, treatment and transport). 
2) Green gas is more expensive than natural gas, and 
therefore financially less attractive to sell to end-
consumers.  
1)  EU policy that encourages energy companies to sell 
more energy from renewable sources to consumers could 
be an incentive for (more) energy companies to enter the 
green gas market. 
End-
consumers 
(households 
and business 
companies) 
1)  Low degree of awareness. The majority of end-
consumer do not care about using renewable energy, 
are not responsive to price differentiation, let alone 
switching contacts concerning energy supply. 
2)  For integration of green gas in residential district 
(re-) development plans, there is a high dependency on 
other sectorial interests and processes. 
3)  Risk to pay more than ‘usual’ (c.f. natural gas use). 
1)  Awareness raising campaigns addressing the benefits 
of green gas use (addressing both households and 
business companies looking to rent office space). 
2)  Demand-side innovation support policies to support 
use of green gas in mobility and domestic use (including 
‘bio-tickets, and subsidies to lower pricing when 
purchase cars that use green gas instead of fossil fuels, 
and tax benefits to those who use green gas instead of 
fossil fuels). 
Local 
governments 
1)  Environmental risks that go along with operation of 
local biogas production plants, treatment and 
transportation of green gas.  
2)  Lack of knowledge among public officials and civil 
servants. 
3)  Inter-department interests conflicts that disfavor the 
municipality becoming a launching customer of locally 
produced green gas. 
1)  Local governments can use public shareholder-
position to influence decision-making by grid operators 
vis-à-vis support of green gas production (e.g. 
investments in biogas infrastructure, biogas treatment, 
transport of green gas, and R&D to support green gas 
value chain management). 
2)  Local governments can train staff on how to cope with 
legal permit requests for biogas plant construction and 
operation. 
3)  Local governments can prioritize local green gas 
production and transport, and adjust (earmarked) spatial 
zoning accordingly. 
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